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Abstract—As state-of-the-art deep neural networks are de-
ployed at the core of more advanced AI-based products and
services, the incentive for copying them (i.e., their intellectual
properties) by rival adversaries is expected to increase consid-
erably over time. The best way to extract or steal knowledge
from such networks is by querying them using a large dataset of
random samples and recording their output, followed by training
a student network to mimic these outputs, without making any
assumption about the original networks. The most effective way
to protect against such a mimicking attack is to provide only the
classification result, without confidence values associated with the
softmax layer.
In this paper, we present a novel method for generating
composite images for attacking a mentor neural network using a
student model. Our method assumes no information regarding
the mentor’s training dataset, architecture, or weights. Further
assuming no information regarding the mentor’s softmax output
values, our method successfully mimics the given neural network
and steals all of its knowledge. We also demonstrate that
our student network (which copies the mentor) is impervious
to watermarking protection methods, and thus would not be
detected as a stolen model.
Our results imply, essentially, that all current neural networks
are vulnerable to mimicking attacks, even if they do not divulge
anything but the most basic required output, and that the student
model which mimics them cannot be easily detected and singled
out as a stolen copy using currently available techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years deep neural networks (DNNs) have been
used very effectively in a wide range of applications. Since
these models have achieved remarkable results, redefining
state-of-the-art solutions for various problems, they have be-
come the “go-to solution” for many challenging real-world
problems, e.g., object recognition [1], [2], object segmenta-
tion [3], autonomous driving [4], automatic text translation [5],
cybersecurity [6], etc.
Training a state-of-the-art deep neural network requires de-
signing the network architecture, collecting and preprocessing
data, and accessing hardware resources, in particular graphics
processing units (GPUs) capable of training such models.
Additionally, training such networks requires a substantial
amount of trial and error. For these reasons, such trained
models are highly valuable, but at the same time they could
be the target of attacks by adversaries (e.g., a competitor)
who might try to duplicate the model and the entire sensi-
tive intellectual property involved, without going through the
tedious and expensive process of developing the models by
themselves. By doing so, all the trouble of data collection,
acquiring computing resources, and the valuable time required
for training the models are spared by the attacker. As state-
of-the-art DNNs are used more extensively in real-world
products, the prevalence of such attacks is expected to increase
over the next few years.
An attacker has two main options for acquiring a trained
model: (1) Acquiring the raw model from the owner’s private
network, which would be a risky criminal offense that requires
a complicated cyber attack on the owner’s network; and (2)
training a student model that mimics the original mentor
model. That is, the attacker could query the original mentor
using a dataset of samples, and train the student model to
mimic the output of the mentor model for each of the samples.
The second option assumes that the mentor is a black box,
i.e., there is no knowledge of its architecture, no access to
the training data used for training it, and no information
regarding the trained model’s weights. We only have access
to the model’s predictions (inference) for a given input. Thus,
such a mentor would effectively teach a student how to mimic
it, by providing its output for different inputs.
In order for mimicking to succeed, a key element is to
utilize the certainty level of a model on a given input, i.e.,
its softmax distribution values. This knowledge is important
for the training of the student network. For example, in case
of a binary classification, classifying an image as category i
with 99% confidence and as category j with 1% confidence is
much more informative than classifying it to category i with,
say, 51% confidence and to category j with 49% confidence.
This knowledge is valuable and much more informative than
the predicted category alone, which in both cases is i. This
confidence value (obtained through the softmax output layer)
also reveals how the model perceives this specific image, and
to what extent the predictions for categories i and j are similar.
In order to protect against such a mimicking attack, a
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trained model may hide this confidence information, by simply
returning only the index with the maximal confidence, without
providing the actual confidence levels (i.e., the softmax values
are concealed, while the output contains merely the predicted
class). Although such a model would substantially limit the
success of a student model using a standard mimicking attack,
we provide in this paper a novel method, by querying the men-
tor with composite images, such that the student effectively
elicits the mentor’s knowledge, even if the mentor provides
the predicted class only.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews previous methods used for network distilling and
mimicking. Section III describes our new approach for a
successful mimicking attack on a mentor which does not
provide softmax outputs. Section IV presents our experimental
results. Finally, Section IV makes concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
Our composite method is engineered to steal a neural
network’s intellectual property. We focus in this section on
stealing both a DNN’s field domain and the DNN’s protection
methods used to prevent a model from being stolen. Our
method can bypass all available protection methods and steal
a model while carrying no marks that can identify the created
model as stolen.
A. Watermarking
The idea of watermarking is well known. It was originally
invented in order to protect digital media from being stolen.
The idea relies on inserting a unique modification or signature
not visible to the human eye. This allows to prove legitimate
ownership by presenting that the owner’s unique signature is
embedded into the digital media [7], [8].
With the same goal in mind, embedding a unique signature
into a model and subsequently identifying the stolen model
based on that signature, some new techniques were invented.
A method to embed a signature into the model’s weights is
described in [9]; it allows for the identification of the unique
signature by examining the model’s weights. This method
assumes that the model and its parameters are available for
examination. Unfortunately, in most cases the model’s weights
are not publicly available; an individual could offer an API-
based service which uses the stolen model, while still keeping
the model’s parameters hidden from the user. Therefore, this
method is not sufficient.
Another method [10] proposes a zero-bit watermarking
algorithm that makes use of adversaries’ examples. It enables
the authentication of the model’s ownership using a set of
queries. The authors rely on predefined examples that give
certain answers. By showing that these exact same answers are
obtained using N queries, one can authenticate their ownership
over the model. However, this idea may be problematic, since
these queries are not unique and there can be infinitely many
of them. An individual can generate queries for which a model
outputs certain answers that match the original queries. In
doing so, anyone can claim ownership. Furthermore, it is
possible that different adversaries will have a different set of
queries which give the exact predefined answers.
Some more recent papers [11], [12] offer a methodology
that allows for inserting a digital watermarking into a deep
learning (DL) model without harming the performance and
with high model pruning resistance. In [13] a method of
inserting watermarking into a model is presented. Specifically,
it allows to identify a stolen model even if it is used via an
application programming interface (API) and returns only the
predicted label. It is done by defining a certain hidden “key”
which can be a certain shape or noise integrated into a part of
the training set. When the model receives an input containing
the key, it will predict with high certainty a completely
unrelated label. Thus, it is possible to use some available APIs
by sending them an image integrated with the hidden key. If
the result is odd and the unrelated label is triggered, it may be
an indication that this model is stolen. Our method is resistant
to this protection mechanism, as its learning is based on the
predictions of the mentor. Specifically, our training is based
on random combinations of inputs, i.e., the chances of sending
the mentor a hidden key that will trigger the unrelated label
mechanism is negligible. We can train and gain the important
knowledge of such a model without learning the watermarks,
thereby assuring that our model would not be identified as
stolen when provided a hidden key as input.
Finally, [14] shows that a malicious adversary, even in
scenarios where the watermark is difficult to remove, can still
evade the verification by the legitimate owners. In conclusion,
even the most advanced watermarking methods are still not
good enough to properly protect a neural network from being
stolen. Our composite method overcomes all of the above
defense mechanisms.
B. Attack Mechanisms
As previously explained, trained deep neural networks are
extremely valuable and worth protecting. Naturally, a lot of
research has been done on attacking such networks and steal-
ing their knowledge. In [15], [16] an attack method exploiting
the confidence level of a model is presented. The assumption
that the confidence level is available is too lenient, as it can
be easily blocked by returning merely the predicted label. Our
composite method shows how to successfully steal a model
which does not reveal its confidence level(s).
In [17] it is shown how to steal the knowledge of a
convolutional neural network (CNN) model using random
unlabeled data. Another known attack mechanism is a Trojan
attack described in [18] or a backdoor attack [19]. Such
attacks are very dangerous, as they might cause various severe
consequences, including endangering human lives, e.g., by
disrupting the actions of a neural network-based autonomous
vehicle. The idea is to spread and deploy infected models,
which will act as expected for almost all regular inputs, except
for a specific engineered input, i.e., a Trojan trigger, in which
case the model would behave in a predefined manner that
could become very dangerous in some cases. Consider, for
example, an infected deep neural network (DNN) model of
an autonomous vehicle, for which a specific given input will
predict making a hard left turn. If such a model is deployed
and triggered in the middle of a highway, the results could be
devastating.
Using our composite method, even if our proposed student
model learns from an infected mentor, it will not catch the
dangerous triggers, and in fact, will act normally despite the
engineered Trojan keys. The reason lies within our training
method, as we randomly compose training examples based
on the mentor’s prediction. In other words, the odds that a
specific engineered key will be sent to the mentor and trigger
a backdoor are negligible, similarly to the way training based
on a mentor containing watermarks is done.
We present some interesting neural network attacks and
show that our composite method is superior to these attacks
and is also robust against infected models.
C. Defense Mechanisms
Besides watermarking, which is the main method of de-
fending a model (or of enabling at least a stolen model
to be exposed), there are some other available interesting
possibilities.
In [20], a method which adds a small controllable perturba-
tion maximizing the loss of the stolen model while preserving
the accuracy is suggested. For some attacking methods this
trick can be effective and significantly slow down an attacker,
if not prevent it completely. This method has no effect on
our composite method, which preserves the accuracy, i.e., for
each sample x, if for a specific index i the softmax layer
predicts F (x)[i] as the maximum value, now the output of our
network for that index would be Fˆ (x)[i] = F (x)[i]+ψ, where
ψ is an intended perturbation, and where argmax(F (x)) =
argmax(Fˆ (x)) = i still holds. This is the important element
of our composite method, which solely relies on the model’s
binary labels and is not affected by this modification.
Most defense mechanisms are based mainly on manipulat-
ing the returned softmax confidence level, shuffling all of the
label probabilities except for the maximal one, or returning a
label without its confidence level. The base line is that all of
these methods have to return the minimal information of what
the predicted label is. Indeed, this is all that is required by
the composite method, so our algorithm is unaffected by such
defense mechanisms.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
In this section we present our novel composite method
which can be used to attack and extract the knowledge of
a black box model even if it completely conceals its softmax
output.
For mimicking a mentor we assume no knowledge of the
model’s training data and no access to it (i.e., we make no use
of any training data used to train the original model). Thus,
the task at hand is very similar to real life scenarios, where
there are plenty of available trained models (as services or
products), without any knowledge of how they were trained
and of the training data used in the process. Additionally, we
assume no knowledge of the model’s network architecture or
weights, i.e., we regard it as an opaque black box. The only
information about the model (which we would like to mimic)
is its input size and the number of output classes (i.e., output
size). For example, we may assume that only the input image
size and the number of possible traffic signs are known, for a
traffic sign classifier.
As previously indicated, another crucial assumption is that
the black box model we aim at attacking does not reveal
its confidence levels. Namely, the model’s output is merely
the predicted label, rather than the softmax values, e.g., in
case of an input image of a traffic sign, whether the model
is 99% confident or only 51% confident that the image is
a stop sign, in both cases it will output “stop sign”, without
further information. We assume the model hides the confidence
values as a safety mechanism against mimicking attacks by
adversaries who are trying to acquire and copy the model’s
IP. Note that outputting merely the predicted class is the
extreme protection possible for a model providing an API-
based prediction, as it is the minimum amount of information
the model must provide.
Our novel method for successfully mimicking a mentor that
does not provide its softmax values, makes use of what we
refer to as composite samples. By combining two different
samples into a single sample (see details below) we effec-
tively tap into the hidden knowledge of the mentor. (In the
next section, we provide experimental results, comparing the
performance of our method and that of standard mimicking
using both softmax and non-softmax outputs.)
For the rest of the discussion we refer to the black box
model (we would like to mimic) and our developed model
(for mimicking it) as a mentor model and a student model,
respectively.
A. Datasets for Mentor and Student
1) Dataset for Mentor Training: CIFAR-10 [21] is an
established dataset used for object recognition. It consists of
60,000 (32 × 32) RGB images from 10 classes, with 6,000
images per class. There are 50,000 training images and 10,000
test images in the official data. The mentor is a pre-trained
model on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We use the test set (from this
dataset) to measure the success rate of our mentor and student
models. Note that the training set of the CIFAR-10 dataset is
never used in the training process by the student (to conform to
our assumption that the student has no access to the data used
by the mentor for training), and the test subset, as mentioned
above, is used for validation only (without training).
2) Dataset for Mimicking Process: ImageNet [22] is a
dataset containing complex, real-world size images. In partic-
ular, ImageNet ILSVRC2012 contains more than 1.2 million
(256 × 256) RGB images from 1000 categories. We use this
dataset (without the labels, i.e., an unlabeled dataset) for the
mimicking process. Each image is down-sampled (32×32) and
fed into the mentor model, and the prediction of the mentor
model is recorded (for later mimicking by the student). Note
that any large unlabeled image dataset could be used instead,
and we used this common large dataset for convenience only.
B. Composite Data Generation
Our goal is to create a diverse dataset that will allow to
observe the predictions of the mentor on many possible inputs.
By doing so, we would gain insights on the way the mentor
behaves for different samples. That is, the more adequate
the input space sample is, the better the performance of the
mimicking process becomes.
The entire available unlabeled data, which is the down-
sampled ImageNet, is contained in an array dataArr. For
each training example to be generated,we choose randomly
two indexes i1, i2, such that, 0 <= i1, i2 < N , where
N is equal to the number of samples we create and use
for training the student model. In our composite method
we choose N = 1, 000, 000, so the amount of generated
training samples created in each epoch is 1, 000, 000. Next,
we randomly choose a ratio p. Once we have i1, i2 and p,
we generate a composite sample, created by combining two
existing images in the dataset. The ratio p determines the
relative influence of the two random images on the generated
sample:
x gen = p ∗ dataArr[i1] + (1− p) ∗ dataArr[i2],
where the label of x gen is a “one-hot” vector, i.e., the index
containing the ’1’ (corresponding to the maximal softmax
value) represents the label predicted by the mentor. The
dataset is generated for every epoch; hence, our composite
dataset changes continuously and it is dynamic. We gain the
predictions of a mentor model on new images during the entire
training process (with less overfitting).
Note that even though in our data-generating mechanism
we create a composite of two random images (with a random
mixture between them), it is possible to create composite
images of N images where N > 2, as well.
Algorithm 1 provides the complete composite data-
generation method, which is run at the beginning of each
epoch. Figure 1 is an illustration of composite data samples
created by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Composite Data Generation
1: Input:
2: mentor - the mentor model
3: dataArr - all available data array
4: N - number of samples to generate
5: Output:
6: X - generated examples
7: Y - corresponing labels
8: function GENERATE DATA(mentor, dataArr, N)
9: X,Y = [], []
10: for i=1 to N do
11: i1 = math.random(len(dataArr))
12: i2 = math.random(len(dataArr))
13: p = math.random(100)/100
14: x_gen = p∗dataArr[i1]+ (1−p)∗dataArr[i2]
15: X.append(x_gen)
16: Y.append(argmax(mentor.predict(x_gen)))
17: end for
18: return X,Y
19: end function
C. Student Model Architecture
The mentor neural network (which we intend to mimic) is
an already trained model that reaches 90.48% test accuracy on
the CIFAR-10 test set.
Our goal in choosing an architecture for the student is to
be generic, such that it would perform well, regardless of the
mentor we try to mimic. Thus, with small adaptations to the
input and output size, we created a modification of the VGG-
16 architecture [23] for the student model. In our model we
use two dense layers of size 512 each, and another dense layer
of size 10 for the softmax output (while in the original VGG-
16 architecture, there are two dense layers of size 4096 and
another dense layer of size 1000 for the softmax layer). Table I
presents the architecture of our student model.
D. Mimicking Process
Using the above described composite data generation, a new
composite dataset is generated for every epoch during the
mimicking process. We train on this dataset using the stochas-
tic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm. Table II describes the
parameters used for training the student model.
Our student model does not use any dropout or regulariza-
tion methods. Such regularization methods are not necessary
since our model does not reach overfitting as a result of the
dynamic dataset (a new composite dataset generated at each
epoch). To evaluate the final performance of the student model,
we test it on a dedicated test set that was used to evaluate also
the mentor model. (Neither the student nor the mentor were
trained on images belonging to the test set.)
We also used learning rate decay, starting from 0.001 and
multiplied by 0.9 every 10 epochs, as we found it essential in
(a) 75% cat 25% dog (b) 70% horse 30% kangaroo
(c) 30% horse 70% ship (d) 40% ship 60% parrot
(e) 50% elephant 50% airplane (f) 80% dog 20% car
(g) 50% tiger 50% dog (h) 20% car 80% elephant
Fig. 1: Illustration of images created using our composite data-
generation method. The images and their relative mixture are
random. Using this method during each epoch we create an
entirely new dataset, with random data not seen before by the
model.
order to reach high accuracy rates. In Section IV we provide
a detailed description of our experimental results.
E. Data Augmentation
Data augmentation is a useful technique frequently used in
the training process of deep neural networks. It is mostly used
to synthetically enlarge a limited size dataset, in an attempt
to generalize and enhance the robustness of a model under
training, and to reduce overfitting.
The basic idea is very simple. The model is not trained
on the same training samples at each epoch. Instead, during
each epoch small random visual modifications are made to the
dataset images. This is done in order to allow the model to
be trained during each epoch on a slightly different dataset,
using the same labels for the training. Examples of simple data
augmentation operations include small vertical and horizontal
Modified VGG-16 Model Architecture for Student Network
3x3 Convolution 64
3x3 Convolution 64
Max pooling
3x3 Convolution 128
3x3 Convolution 128
Max pooling
3x3 Convolution 256
3x3 Convolution 256
3x3 Convolution 256
Max pooling
3x3 Convolution 512
3x3 Convolution 512
3x3 Convolution 512
Max pooling
3x3 Convolution 512
3x3 Convolution 512
3x3 Convolution 512
Max pooling
Dense 512
Dense 512
Softmax 10
TABLE I: The architecture used in the composite training
experiment for the student model. This architecture is a
modification of the VGG-16 architecture which has proven
to be very successful and robust. By performing only small
modifications over the input and output layers, we can adapt
this architecture for a student model intended to mimic a
different mento model.
Parameters Values
Learning rate 0.001
Activation function ReLU
Batch size 128
Dropout rate -
L2 regularization -
SGD momentum 0.9
Data augmentation -
TABLE II: Parameters used for training in the composite
experiment.
shifts of the image, a slight rotation of the image (usually by
θ for 0◦ < θ <= 15◦), etc.
This technique is used for our student models, which are
trained on the same dataset during each epoch. However,
for the composite model experiment, we found it to have
no effect on the performance. Our composite data-generation
method ensures virtually a continuous set of infinitely many
new samples never seen before; thus, data augmentation is not
necessary here at all.
Our end goal is to represent a nonlinear function, which
takes an n-dimensional input and transforms it to an m-
dimensional output, e.g., a function that takes an image of
size 256 × 256 of a road and returns one of Y possible
actions that an autonomous vehicle should take. Using data
augmentation, we can train the model to better represent
the required nonlinear function. For our composite method,
though, this would be redundant, since the training process is
always performed on different random inputs, which allows for
estimating empirically the nonlinear function in a much better
way, without using the original training dataset for training the
model.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental Results for Unprotected Mentor (with Soft-
max Output) and Standard Mimicking
To obtain a baseline for comparison, we assume in this
experiment that the mentor in question reveals its confidence
levels by providing the values of its softmax output. (We refer
to it as an “unprotected mentor”.)
We use here the same modified VGG-16 architecture pre-
sented in Table I.
We create, in this case, a new dataset for the student model
only once and use it together with standard data augmentation.
We feed each training sample from the down-sampled Ima-
geNet into the mentor, and save the pairs of its input image
and softmax label distribution (i.e., its softmax layer output).
The total size of this dataset is over 1.2 million samples
(the size of the ImageNet ILSVRC2012 dataset). Once the
dataset is created, we train the student using regular supervised
training with SGD. In this experiment, since overfitting would
occur without regularization, we use dropout to improve
generalization. The parameters used for training this model
are presented in Table III.
Using these parameters, we obtained a maximum test accu-
racy of 89.1% for the CIFAR-10 test set, namely, 1.38% less
than the mentor’s 90.48% success rate. (Note that the student
was never trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset, and instead, after
completing the mimicking process using the separate unrelated
dataset, its performance was only tested on the CIFAR-10 test
set.)
Parameters Values
Learning rate 0.001
Activation function ReLU
Batch size 128
Dropout rate 0.2
L2 regularization 0.0005
SGD momentum 0.9
Data augmentation Used
TABLE III: Parameters used for the training process using
standard (non-composite) mimicking.
B. Experimental Results for Protected Mentor (without Soft-
max Output) and Standard Mimicking
In this experiment we assume that the mentor reveals the
predicted label with no information about the certainty level
(i.e., it is considered a “protected mentor”). This is a real-
life scenario, in which an API-based service is queried by
uploading inputs, and only the predicted output class (without
softmax values) is returned.
By sending only the correct labels, the models are more
protected, in the sense that they reveal less information to
a potential attacker. For this reason, this method has be-
come a common defense mechanism for protecting intellectual
property when neural networks are deployed in real-world
scenarios.
In this subsection we try a standard mimicking attack
(without composite images). Here we execute exactly the same
training process of the soft labels experiment (described in
the previous subsection) with one important difference. In
this case, the labels available for the student are merely one-
hot labels provided by the mentor, and not the full softmax
distribution of the mentor. For each training sample (from
the down-sampled ImageNet dataset), we take the output
distribution, find the index with the maximum value, and set it
to ’1’ (while setting all the other indices to ’0’). The student
can observe only this final vector, with a single ’1’ for the
correct class, and ’0’ for all other classes. This accurately
simulates a process that can be applied on an API service.
The student only knows at this point the mentor’s prediction,
but not its level of certainty. We use the same parameters of
Table III for the mimicking process.
The success rate in this experiment is the lowest; the student
reached only ∼ 87.5% accuracy on the CIFAR-10 test set, i.e.,
substantially lower than that of the student which mimicked
an unprotected mentor.
C. Experimental Results for Protected Mentor (without Soft-
max Output) and Composite Data Mimicking
In this experiment we assume again that our mentor reveals
the predicted label with no information about the certainty
level. However, instead of launching a standard attack on the
mentor, we employ here our novel composite data generation
as described in Algorithm 1, in order to generate new compos-
ite data samples at each epoch. In this case, the student only
has access to the predicted labels (minimum output required
from a protected mentor).
Unlike the previous two experiments using standard mim-
icking, we do not use here data augmentation or regularization,
since virtually all of the data samples are always new, and are
generated continuously.
Figure 2 illustrates the expected predictions from a well-
trained model for certain combined input images. Empiri-
cally, this is not totally accurate, since the presentation and
overlap of objects in an image also affect the output of the
real model. However, despite this caveat, the experimental
results presented below show that our method provides a good
approximation.
Training with composite data, we obtained 89.59% accuracy
on the CIFAR-10 test set, which is only 0.89% less than that of
the mentor itself. (Again, note that the student is not trained on
any of the CIFAR-10 images, and that the test set is used only
for the final testing, after the mimicking process is completed.)
This is the highest accuracy among all of the experiments
conducted; surprisingly, it is even superior to the results of
standard mimicking for an unprotected mentor (which does
divulge its softmax output).
Figure 3 depicts the accuracy over time (i.e., epoch number)
for the composite and soft-label experiments. As can be seen,
the success rate of the composite experiment is superior to that
of the soft-label experiment during almost the entire training
process. Even though the latter has access to valuable addi-
tional knowledge, our composite method performs consistently
better without access to the mentor’s softmax output.
A summary of the experimental results is presented in
Table IV, including relative accuracy to the mentor’s accu-
racy rate. The results show that standard mimicking obtained
∼ 98.5% of the accuracy of an unprotected mentor, and only
∼ 96.7% of its accuracy when the mentor was protected.
However, using the composite mimicking method, the student
reached (over) 99% of the accuracy of a fully protected mentor.
Thus, even when a mentor only reveals its predictions
without their confidence levels, the model is not immune to
mimicking and knowledge stealing. Our method is generic,
and can be used on any model with only minor modifications
on the input and output layers of the architecture.
Method Mentor Status Test Accuracy Relative Accuracy
Standard Unprotected 89.10% 98.47%
Standard Protected 87.46% 96.66%
Composite Protected 89.59% 99.01%
TABLE IV: Summary of the experiments. The table provides
the CIFAR-10 test accuracy of three student models in ab-
solute terms and in comparison to the 90.48% test accuracy
achieved by the mentor itself. The three mimicking methods
use standard mimicking for unprotected and protected mentors,
as well as composite mimicking for a protected mentor, which
provides the best results.
V. CONCLUSION
In view of the tremendous DNN-based advancements in
various hard, non-trivial problem domains in recent years, the
issue of protecting complex DNN models has gained consid-
erable interest. The computational power and significant effort
required by a training process makes a well-trained network
very valuable. Thus, much research has been devoted to attacks
(a) 50% dog 50% cat
(b) 60% cat 40% car
(c) 90% ship 10% car
Fig. 2: Generated images and their corresponding expected
softmax distribution, which reveals the model’s certainty level
for each example. In practice, the manner by which objects
overlap and the degree of their overlap largely affect the
certainty level.
on DNNs and to their defense, where the most common
defense mechanism is to conceal the model’s certainty levels
and output merely a predicted label.
In this paper, we have presented a novel composite image
attack method for extracting the knowledge of a DNN model,
which is not affected by the above “label only” defense
mechanism. Specifically, our composite method assumes only
that this mechanism is activated and relies solely on the label
prediction returned from a black box model. We assume no
knowledge about this model’s training process and its original
training data. In contrast to other methods suggested for steal-
ing or mimicking a trained model, our method does not rely
on the softmax distribution supplied by a trained model with a
certainty level across all categories. Therefore, methods adding
a controlled perturbation to the returned softmax distribution
in order to protect a given model are essentially ineffective
against our method.
By employing our method, a user can attack a model and
Fig. 3: Student test accuracies for composite and soft-label
experiments, training the student over 100 epochs. The student
trained using the composite method is superior during almost
the entire training process. The two experiments were selected
for visual comparison as they reached the highest success rates
for the test set.
reach a very close success rate compared to it, while relying
only on the minimal information that has to be given by
the model, namely its label prediction for a given input.
Our method demonstrates that the current available defense
mechanisms for deep neural networks are not sufficient. Using
the composite attack method, countless neural networks-based
services can be attacked and copied into a rival model which
can then be deployed and affect the product’s market share.
The rival deployed model will be undetectable and carry no
mark proofs that it is stolen, as explained in Section II(A).
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